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ABSTRACT
Focusing on post-Cold War international interventions, this article
traces the emergence of a malaise within the liberal universal
project. While it is agreed that the liberal peace is in crisis, there is
disagreement on the nature of the impasse. For mainstream IR
scholars, there is a resistance by actors in the Global South to
follow the policy dictates of powerful Western governments and
the international organisations they dominate. While this is
certainly the case, this article argues that the crisis of the liberal
peace is also rooted in the erosion of liberal universal foundations.
In addition to liberal norms being rejected by Southern actors, the
liberal peace crisis reflects a deeper scepticism on the part of
international policy elites regarding the ability of liberal market
democracy to resolve a wide range of social, political and
economic problems. In addition to being a crisis of legitimacy
between the Global North and the Global South, there seems to
exist an erosion of liberal universal foundations which is
undermining the ability of international policy elites to act
purposively in global affairs. This argument is drawn out with
reference to post-liberal approaches to peacebuilding which
foreground the radical potential of non-liberal forms of agency.
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This article traces the emergence of a growing malaise within the liberal peace project.
Rather than representing solely a questioning of legitimacy by political actors in the
Global South,1 the argument proposed here is that post-liberal approaches to peacebuild-
ing reflect an erosion of the liberal peace foundations of international policymakers.2 The
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1Christopher Daase and Nicole Deitelhoff, Zur Rekonstruktion Globaler Herrschaft Aus Dem Widerstand, Internationale Dis-
sidenz Working Paper 1 (Frankfurt am Main: Goethe University Frankfurt, 2014), http://dissidenz.net/workingpapers/
wp1-2014-daase-deitelhoff.pdf; Christopher Daase and Nicole Deitelhoff, ‘Internationale Dissidenz. Ein Forschungspro-
gramm’, in Macht Und Widerstand in Der Globalen Politik, ed. Julian Junk and Christian Volk (Baden-Baden: Nomos,
2013), 163–75; Christopher Daase, ‘Was Ist Widerstand?’, Aus Politik Und Zeitgeschichte 64, no. 27 (2014): 3–9.
2Oliver Richmond, ‘A Post-Liberal Peace: Eirenism and the Everyday’, Review of International Studies 35 (2009): 557–80;
Oliver Richmond, ‘Resistance and the Post-Liberal Peace’, Millennium 38, no. 3 (2010): 1–28; Oliver Richmond,
‘Beyond Liberal Peace? Responses to Backsliding’, in New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding, ed. Edward Newman,
Roland Paris, and Oliver Richmond (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2009), 54–77; Oliver Richmond, ‘Towards
a Post-Liberal Peace’, International Political Sociology, 2011; Oliver Richmond, A Post-Liberal Peace (London: Routledge,
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crisis of liberal peace is to a large extent internal to Western policy and academic dis-
course, rather than being exclusively a sign of resistance from the Global South. The
aim of this article is to make a case in favour of normative and analytical foundationalism.
It is not a defence of the liberal peace paradigm per se. Critical scholars have rightly
pointed out that the liberal peace paradigm has been used to stabilise an unequal and
unjust international order and reinforce the status-quo of Western dominance.3 In
order to address key issues of rights, equality and justice in the international system
the liberal peace model might not be the best option. In particular, the liberal peace
approach seems to be unable to remedy the structural inequalities (re-) produced by a
capitalist world economy.
The first section deals with Roland Paris’ confident call for a ‘new civilizing mission’.4
Paris questioned the naturalness of the transition to liberal market democracy and,
instead, emphasised the (informal) institutional preconditions of competitive markets
and pluralist politics. However, although he was sceptical about the path to liberal
market democracy, Paris ultimately remained a classic Wilsonian outlook. He believed
in the ability of markets, human rights and the secular state to overcome the obstacles
faced by post-conflict and other transitional societies.
This liberal universal project has attracted widespread critique. Rita Abrahamsen, for
instance, saw the good governance agenda as a way of maintaining the hegemony of
Northern actors over the internal affairs of the Global South.5 For Abrahamsen, post-
Cold War interventions reflected a moment of ‘Western triumphalism’ and a ‘continuation
of Europe’s “civilizing mission”’.6 What matters here is that despite lingering doubts about
the process of transition, the ‘new interventionism’7 of the 2000s articulated a ‘belief in
the pre-eminence of Western political values’.8 Similarly, Beate Jahn has shown how
that the political, social and economic difficulties of democratisation are ‘defined in oppo-
sition to the liberal ideal’.9 Jahn has analysed convincingly how the failures of transition
have been blamed on the larger than expected deficits in Third World countries and how
this framing has stimulated more ambitious and long-term interventions ‘designed to
reconstitute every aspect of the target society in the image of liberal market democra-
cies’.10 For the policy elites of the 2000s, the failure of intervention to achieve its stated
goals merely reinforced ‘liberalism´s basic assumptions – of its own superiority; of its
right, competence and power […]’.11 Policy failure did not lead to a ‘critical self-analysis
and actual revision of liberalism itself’.12
In contrast, post-liberal frameworks propose precisely such a questioning of liberalism.
The second section engages with the local turn by leading post-liberal scholars Oliver
3Michael Pugh, Neil Cooper, and Mandy Turner, Whose Peace. The Political Economy of Peacebuilding (London: Palgrave,
2008).
4‘International Peacebuilding and the “Mission Civilisatrice”’, Review of International Studies 28, no. 4 (2002): 637–56.
5Disciplining Democracy. Development Discourse and Good Governance in Africa. (London: Zed Books, 2000).
643, 36.
7Simon Chesterman, You, The People. The United Nations, Transnational Administration, and State-Building (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2005), 2.
8Abrahamsen, Disciplining Democracy. Development Discourse and Good Governance in Africa, 35.
9‘The Tragedy of Liberal Diplomacy: Democratization, Intervention, Statebuilding (Part II)’, Journal of Intervention and Sta-





Richmond and Roger Mac Ginty.13 In a nutshell, Richmond and Mac Ginty suggest that an
open-ended, unscripted conversation with the local goes against the ‘universalism that
lies at the heart of liberal optimism and notions of universal rights’.14 For Richmond
and Mac Ginty, engaging with the local – and the even deeper ‘local-local’ – deliberately
‘undermine[s]’ the ‘legitimacy of universal projects’.15 Bringing in local voices requires a
fundamental rejection of the ‘liberal peace paradigm itself’.16 As long as international
policy elites are wrapped up in liberal universal ideology they will not be able to see,
let alone to fully appreciate, ‘the local’. Here, ‘the local’ is not defined substantially, but
negatively as the opposite of liberal universalism. Since international policy elites are
defined by their very liberal universal episteme, the quest to identify and freely interact
with genuinely local actors is set up for failure. The ‘deep gaps between liberal govern-
ance [i.e. international interveners] and local praxis in terms of culture and customs’
can never be fully overcome.17 Post-liberal peacebuilding can be nothing else but a
mutual attempt by international interveners and post-conflict subjects to overcome
their own exclusions and binaries.18 Hence, Richmond’s point that post-liberalism seeks
to introduce a new ‘sensitivity’, rather than an ‘alternative paradigm for “peace”’.19
The final section connects these critical insights to the question of international auth-
ority. It argues that the current crisis of the liberal peace is to a large extent an internal one.
In addition to being contested by the targets of international policy intervention, the
legitimacy of the liberal peace project is increasingly questioned from within the peace-
building community itself. The crisis of the liberal peace project does not only hinge on
the ‘question of domination: Who can and who may proscribe to the actors of inter-
national politics how they ought to behave?’.20 It is part of a larger difficulty to ‘giv[e]
meaning to authority itself’.21 This is clearly evidenced in contemporary policy thinking
on international peacebuilding. For example, the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) stresses that ‘there is no clear, predefined pathway to peace’.22
Clearly rejecting any universalist approach, the OECD seeks to ‘[m]ake the country context
the starting point, rather than basing decisions on a development partneŕs agenda’.23
Imposing one-size-fits-all liberal blueprints is seen with scepticism. Western policymakers
should refrain from ‘impos[ing] models and norms on the rest of the world’.24 Building
peace is an ‘endogenously driven process’ in which international interveners may act as
‘moderators and facilitators’, but never as ‘implementers of outside “fixes”’.25 The OECD
13Roger Mac Ginty and Oliver Richmond, ‘The Local Turn in Peace Building: A Critical Agenda for Peace’, Third World Quar-
terly 34, no. 5 (2013): 763–83.
14778.
15Ibid.
16Richmond, ‘Beyond Liberal Peace?’, 55.
17Richmond, ‘Beyond Liberal Peace?’, 66.
18see Richmond, ‘A Post-Liberal Peace: Eirenism and the Everyday’, 580.
19Richmond, ‘Resistance and the Post-Liberal Peace’, 682.
20Daase and Deitelhoff, Zur Rekonstruktion Globaler Herrschaft Aus Dem Widerstand, 3, original emphasis, author’s
translation.
21Frank Furedi, Authority. A Sociological History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 383.
22Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, International Support to Post-Conflict Transition. Rethinking
Policy, Changing Practice (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2012), 24.
23Supporting Statebuilding in Situations of Conflict and Fragility: Policy Guidance (Paris: OECD, 2011), 60.
24Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 25.
25Ibid., 3; Importantly, the argument in this article operates on the level of governmental rationality (Michel Foucault
2004. The Birth of Biopolitics. New York: Picador). It is concerned with the way in which political decisionmakers
and their organic intellectuals think about the best possible way of governing. It deals with government’s
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also emphasises the ‘endogenous’ character of statebuilding, the fact that social trans-
formation needs to be locally driven, rather than externally imposed.26 Rather than focus-
ing on their ability to trigger positive change, international organisations like the OECD
today are clearly more concerned about all the things that could go wrong. Driven less
by a positive image of their own potential contribution, their primary concern is to ‘[d]o
no harm’ and avoid ‘unintended outcomes’.27 This is a far cry from Paris’ ‘new civilizing
mission’ and clearly showcases how the liberal peace is being eroded from within by
the policy and academic communities. It demonstrates forcefully how the growing
inability of international policy elites to act purposively in the world is not exclusively a
sign of resistance ‘from below’, but also an expression of self-doubt.
Interventionary ambition and the civilising mission
Looking back at the 2000s it is difficult not to notice the interventionary zeal of leading
Western governments and international organisations. As Jarat Chopra rightly points
out, by the end of the 1990s, there was an increasing ‘converg[ence] on ideas for compre-
hensive, political missions’.28 While initial international policy efforts in post-conflict and
other transitional societies had focused on early elections and the quick withdrawal of
external actors, the missions in Kosovo and Timor Leste signalled the arrival of much
more ambitious, long-term forms of engagement. This was in large part due to a new
focus on the institutional preconditions of competitive markets and pluralist politics. In
the words of leading statebuilding theorists Roland Paris and Timothy Sisk, ‘little atten-
tion’ had so far been paid to the ‘longer-term tasks of constructing or strengthening
the institutional structures necessary for democratic governance and market reforms
[…] to take root’.29 In the wake of the new emphasis on institutional preconditions, inter-
national peacebuilding missions became ‘more complex and multifaceted’.30
A key contribution to the peacebuilding debate at the time was Roland Paris’ At Waŕs
End which stressed the importance of ‘Institutionalization Before Liberalization’.31 Paris
was a staunch believer in the ability of free markets and democratic politics to remedy
a broad range of political, economic and social problems – from economic underdevelop-
ment to violent conflict and environmental degradation. However, he was sceptical about
the peaceful transition to liberal market democracy. Paris argued that the ‘desire to turn
war-torn societies into stable market democracies was not the problem’.32 Instead, he
claimed that international peacebuilders had been underestimating the ‘destabilizing
consciousness of itself. Therefore, it is less interested in the gap between goals and implementation or the actual prac-
tices of intervention on the ground.
26Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, ‘State Building in Situations of Fragility. Initial Findings –
August 2008’ (OECD, 2008).
27Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Do No Harm. International Support for Statebuilding (Paris:
OECD, 2010).
28‘Building State Failure in East Timor’, in State-Building. Theory and Practice, ed. Aidan Hehir and Neil Robinson (London:
Routledge, 2007), 149.
29‘Introduction. Understanding the Contradictions of Post-War Statebuilding’, in The Dilemmas of Statebuilding. Confront-
ing the Contradictions of Post-War Peace Operations, ed. Roland Paris and Timothy Sisk (London: Routledge, 2010), 6.
30Paris and Sisk, 56?; see Edward Newman, Roland Paris, and Oliver Richmond, ‘Introduction’, in New Perspectives on
Liberal Peacebuilding, ed. Edward Newman, Roland Paris, and Oliver Richmond (Tokyo: United Nations University
Press, 2009), 7; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, International Engagement in Fragile
States. Can’t We Do Better? (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2011), 27, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264086128-en.
31At War’s End (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
326.
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effects of liberalization’.33 What he advocated was a ‘more controlled and gradual
approach to liberalisation, combined with the immediate building of governmental insti-
tutions that can manage these political and economic reforms’.34 Put differently, Paris
continued to support the end goal of liberal market democracy and hailed its pacifying
effects. However, he problematised the transition process to this end state, calling for a
‘more interventionist and long-term approach to peacebuilding’.35 What matters here is
the fact that Paris did not question the Wilsonian aims of intervention per se.36 If anything,
he propagated the expansion of international policy efforts to spread liberal market
democracy. While Paris expressed doubts about the transitional process and the (infor-
mal) institutional preconditions of stable market democracy, there is still a very strong
liberal telos foregrounding the benefits of markets and elections.
It is this propagation of liberal market democracy as the ultimate aim of intervention
which led Paris to claim that international policy elites were – and should be – embarking
on an ‘updated (and more benign) version of the mission civilisatrice, or the colonial-era
belief that the European imperial powers had a duty to “civilize” dependent populations
and territories’.37 Paris seemed to welcome the fact that international peacebuilders were
‘promulgat[ing] a particular vision of how states should organize themselves internally’.38
His support of liberal market democracy is inseparable from the claim that peacebuilders
should ‘“transmit[…]” standards of appropriate behaviour from the Western-liberal core
of the international system to the failed states of the periphery’.39 Paris’ argument and
the statebuilding projects of the 2000s which it helped to shape are in line with the
‘belief that one model of domestic governance – liberal market democracy – is superior
to all others’.40 Although Paris questions the natural transition to a market economy
and competitive party politics, he is very much a defender of liberal market democracy
as the end goal of intervention. In equally affirmative terms, Simon Chesterman suggested
that the problem is ‘not that transitional administration is colonial in character’, but that it
is ‘not colonial enough’.41
The emergence of a new civilising mission has attracted widespread and well-founded
criticism. Rita Abrahamsen, for example, considered the good governance agenda of the
World Bank and other international organisations as ‘one way in which the North main-
tains and legitimizes its continued power and hegemony in the South’.42 For Abrahamsen,
the spread of liberal market democracy was an instance of Northern domination. Good
governance strategies, like Paris’ ‘Institutionalization Before Liberalization’ approach,
were enabling the West to ‘continue its undisputed hegemony on the African conti-
nent’.43 They reflected the ambition of international policy elites to claim the ‘moral









41You, The People. The United Nations, Transnational Administration, and State-Building, 12.
42Disciplining Democracy. Development Discourse and Good Governance in Africa, ix.
4344.
44Abrahamsen, 44.
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Importantly, for the critics of the new interventionism, efforts to spread liberal market
democracy were signs of ideological confidence. Abrahamsen claimed that the good gov-
ernance agenda spoke for a ‘Western triumphalism’, a ‘belief in the pre-eminence of
Western political values’.45 Similarly, Beate Jahn saw the drive to intervene even after
the most devastating failures as rooted in the ‘length, breadth and depth of the power
of the liberal ideology’.46 According to Jahn, international intervention geared towards
establishing liberal market democracy evidenced ‘vigour and conviction’.47 They show-
cased the ‘pervasive power of the liberal ideology’.48 In line with the liberal approach
of intervention, host societies were seen as a ‘uniform or “virgin” territory’ to be
remade in the image of ‘externally conceived models’ of peace.49 Steeped in liberal ideol-
ogy, international interveners were effectively engaging in self-imposition. As Séverine
Autesserre argued in her much-discussed book on Peaceland, peacebuilders were
relying on their ‘own models of how best to rebuild a state, their own beliefs about the
responsibilities a government should meet, and their own notions of what ordinary citi-
zens would want’.50 Local political practices were rejected with a view to being ‘replace
[d] […] from above with Western patterns of liberal democracy’.51 Interveners were claim-
ing ‘transformative power over post-conflict spaces’, seeing post-conflict societies
‘according to how they saw themselves: as liberal or Wilsonian’.52
Notably, according to mainstream IR scholars, this liberal statebuilding model ‘has
remained largely unchanged and unchallenged since it took shape in the early
1990s’.53 In contrast to this popular view, the next section will elaborate how the
liberal ambition of international interveners is increasingly questioned from within by
post-liberal calls to engage with local context and everyday forms of agency.54
Post-liberal peacebuilding and the local turn
Post-liberal peacebuilding constitutes a clear departure from the liberal hubris of Paris’
‘new civilizing mission’.55 In the post-liberal framework, the notions of the ‘local’ and
the ‘everyday’ serve as the discursive means for articulating a sweeping critique of
4534, 35.
46‘The Tragedy of Liberal Diplomacy: Democratization, Intervention, Statebuilding (Part II)’, 226.
47225.
48Jahn, 227.
49Edward Newman, ‘“Liberal” Peacebuilding Debates’, in New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding, ed. Edward Newman,
Roland Paris, and Oliver Richmond (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2009), 42; see Michael Wesley, ‘The State of
the Art on the Art of State Building’, Global Governance 14, no. 3 (2008): 374, 380; Caroline Hughes, ‘“We Just Take What
They Offer”: Community Empowerment in Post-War Timor-Leste’, in New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding (Tokyo:
United Nations University Press, 2009), 219, 220, 223, 228.
50Peaceland. Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2014), 4, emphasis added.
51Jason Franks, ‘Beware of Liberal Peacebuilders Bearing Gifts: The Deviancy of Liberal Peace in Palestine and Israel’, in
New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding, ed. Edward Newman, Roland Paris, and Oliver Richmond (Tokyo: United
Nations University Press, 2009), 283.
52John Heathershaw, ‘Seeing like the International Community: How Peacebuilding Failed (and Survived) in Tajikistan’,
Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 2, no. 3 (2008): 329.
53David Roberts, ‘Hybrid Polities and Indigenous Pluralities. Advanced Lessons in Statebuilding from Cambodia’, in Sta-
tebuilding and Intervention. Policies, Practices and Paradigms, ed. David Chandler (London: Routledge, 2009), 167.
54Richmond, A Post-Liberal Peace; Richmond, ‘Towards a Post-Liberal Peace’; Mac Ginty and Richmond, ‘The Local Turn in
Peace Building: A Critical Agenda for Peace’.
55Richmond, ‘Towards a Post-Liberal Peace’; Richmond, A Post-Liberal Peace.
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liberal-universal foundations. They are meant to work as ‘a fundamental challenge to the
dominant ways of thinking and acting about peace’.56 The local turn is defined in opposi-
tion to the universalism allegedly informing international interveners – ‘a retreat from the
certainties and binaries that underpin Western modes of thinking’.57 The local turn views
liberal peacebuilding as fundamentally flawed: ‘liberal democracy, liberal human rights,
market values, the integration of societies into globalization and the centralized secular
state […] are not necessarily universal […] values’.58 Rather than constituting a universally
applicable paradigm, liberal market democracy constitutes the West’s own local. It is the
West’s own parochial identity. In the words of Oliver Richmond, liberal peace is itself a
‘form of customary political community’.59 It is their social embeddedness in this particu-
laristic identity which keeps international policy elites from openly engaging with other
epistemologies. Because of their liberal universal blinders, international interveners can
literally not ‘“see” what is happening on the ground’.60 The exclusions, binaries and hier-
archies of liberal universalismmake the local ‘elusive’ for international policymakers.61 The
local – defined as the liberal universal interveners’ Other – is ‘all but invisible’.62 What Rich-
mond and other post-liberal authors call for is a much more ‘empathetic understanding’
of post-conflict societies.63 Peacebuilding needs to ‘move beyond liberalism’64 if it wants
to make room for ‘hidden agencies’ to come to the fore.65 Post-liberalism is a search for
essentially ‘unknowable others’66 who are defined negatively as everything but liberal
universal.
The key feature of post-liberalism for the purposes of this article is that it deliberately
avoids formulating a ‘new metanarrative of “peace”’.67 The point of highlighting the ‘pol-
itical and normative closure’ of the liberal peace is not to replace liberal values with a fresh
set of new foundations.68 In the eyes of post-liberal authors, this would merely result in
the creation of a ‘new hegemonic “-ism” or a grand metanarrative’.69 The critique of
liberal universalism, therefore, does not involve an ‘alternative paradigm of “peace”’.70
Reconstructing international peacebuilding from the local and the everyday cannot be
accomplished ‘in general theory’.71 Rather than a new foundational theory, post-liberal-
ism revolves around a new political and cultural ‘sensitivity’.72 Where liberal universalism
stresses homogeneity and reductionism, post-liberalism foregrounds ‘particularism and
local variation that confront universalist ideas and practices’.73 What coheres post-
56Mac Ginty and Richmond, ‘The Local Turn in Peace Building: A Critical Agenda for Peace’, 772.
57Mac Ginty and Richmond, 780.
58Newman, Paris, and Richmond, ‘Introduction’, 12.





64Richmond, ‘Beyond Liberal Peace? Responses to Backsliding’, 60.
65Richmond, ‘Resistance and the Post-Liberal Peace’, 670.
66Richmond, ‘A Post-Liberal Peace: Eirenism and the Everyday’, 566.
67Richmond, A Post-Liberal Peace, 213.
68Richmond, ‘A Post-Liberal Peace: Eirenism and the Everyday’, 576.
69Richmond, 580.
70Richmond, ‘Resistance and the Post-Liberal Peace’, 682.
71Richmond, 682.
72Richmond, 682.
73Mac Ginty and Richmond, ‘The Local Turn in Peace Building: A Critical Agenda for Peace’, 772.
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liberal peacebuilding is not a set of foundational norms and assumptions but the notion
of ‘resistance’ to any totalising knowledge claims.74 The aim of post-liberal peacebuilding,
hence, is not to ‘export ideologies of peace’, but instead to ‘seek open and free communi-
cation between post-conflict individuals and peace builders about the nature of peace in
each context’.75 In stark contrast to Paris’ domineering ‘new civilizing mission’, Richmond
stresses how locally-informed peacebuilding needs to ‘be wary of any problem-solving
meta-narratives relating to power, security, sovereignty, status or territory’.76 This
amounts to a general rejection of governance where this involves ‘the claim to know
on behalf of others, to govern on behalf of others, to secure others or to defer
agency’.77 While the critique of totalising knowledge claims and top-down intervention
are a welcome corrective to the domineering liberal peace interventions of the 1990s,
post-liberalism reflects an approach of ‘critique-as-alternative’78 in which the episteme
of both the interveners and intervened are constantly deconstructed, with no firm
ground re-emerging. As Gezim Visoka rightly points out, the ‘critique-as-alternative’
approach of Mac Ginty and Richmond ‘offers a pragmatic critique of ethics’.79 However,
Steve Smith has stressed that ‘the main failure of the alternative perspectives is that
whilst they have done much to undermine the epistemological assumptions of the main-
stream, they have not succeeded in establishing an alternative epistemology’.80 That, for
post-liberals, would constitute yet-another domineering imposition from outside.
In sum, post-liberalism is a response to ‘issues of alterity’ questioning the viability of
liberal universalism in non-Western contexts.81 In so doing, it speaks for what Mark
Duffield has astutely identified as a ‘deepening malaise within the liberal project’.82 More
broadly, post-liberalism reflects a ‘post-ideological inability’ to formulate a ‘viable narrative
framework within which to situate the exercise of power’.83 As the next section draws out,
this is an internal crisis of foundations rather than an external one of questioning legitimacy.
Lack of legitimacy or crisis of foundations?
The problem of international authority today does not seem to be exclusively an exter-
nal one of the unwillingness of subordinate states and civil society actors to accept the
74Richmond, ‘Beyond Liberal Peace? Responses to Backsliding’, 62.
75Richmond, ‘A Post-Liberal Peace: Eirenism and the Everyday’, 580.
76‘Resistance and the Post-Liberal Peace’, 671.
77Richmond, 671; see Autesserre, Peaceland. Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention, 53,
108–9.
78Gëzim Visoka, ‘Critique and Alternativity in International Relations’, International Studies Review 21, no. 4 (2019): 678–
704.
79Visoka, 685.
80Steve Smith, ‘Alternative and Critical Perspective’, in Millennial Reflections on International Studies (Ann Arbor: Michigan
University Press, 2002), 195–208.
81Oliver Richmond, ‘Becoming Liberal, Unbecoming Liberalism. Liberal-Local Hybridity via the Everyday as a Response to
the Paradoxes of Liberal Peacebuilding’, in Rethinking the Liberal Peace. External Models and Local Alternatives, ed.
Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), 42.
82‘Challenging Environments: Danger, Resilience and the Aid Industry’, Security Dialogue 43, no. 5 (2012): 487.
83Philip Cunliffe, ‘State-Building. Power without Responsibility’, in State-Building. Theory and Practice, ed. Aidan Hehir and
Neil Robinson (London: Routledge, 2007), 53; see Philip Cunliffe, ‘Sovereignty and the Politics of Responsibility’, in Poli-
tics without Sovereignty. A Critique of Contemporary International Relations, ed. Christopher Bickerton, Philip Cunliffe, and
Alexander Gourevitch (Abingdon: UCL Press, 2007), 39–57; Christopher Bickerton, Philip Cunliffe, and Alexander Gour-
evitch, eds., Politics without Sovereignty. A Critique of Contemporary International Relations (London: UCL Press, 2007);
Christopher Bickerton, ‘State-Building: Exporting State Failure’, Arena Journal, no. 32 (2009): 101–23; Alexander Gour-
evitch, ‘The Unfailing of the State’, Journal of International Affairs 58, no. 1 (2004): 255–60.
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policy directives of Western interveners. The crisis of international authority does not
appear to speak solely for a break-down of ‘legitimate domination’.84 Christopher
Daase has pointed out the ‘[i]ncreasing resistance against liberal economic models,
the disrespect of international rules and open protest against “Western values”’,
seeing them as ‘signs of a legitimacy deficit’.85 Their concern is with changing forms
of opposition and dissent in the international system. There is arguably a ‘legitimacy
crisis of the global system’.86 However, where I would like to differ from Daase and Dei-
telhoff is on their claim that the crisis of authority speaks primarily for a growing uncer-
tainty concerning the ‘question of domination: Who can and who may proscribe to the
actors of international politics how they ought to behave?’.87 In addition to legitimate
global order becoming more instable by being openly questioned ‘from below’, there
also seems to exist a difficulty within contemporary Western societies to ‘giv[e]
meaning to authority itself’: ‘In effect, authority ha[s] become a sort of embarrassment
to those who are called upon to exercise it – a subject best avoided’.88 The contempor-
ary crisis of international authority is understood in this article less in terms of ‘growing
resistance against the existing order of international politics’89 and more as revealing an
internal process of normative and analytical deconstruction that is incapable of estab-
lishing a new basis of authority.
It is a crisis of ‘epistemic authority’,90 but it is to some extent internal to Western gov-
ernmental discourse, rather than being primarily an issue of legitimacy breaking down. If
Michael Zürn et al. define ‘epistemic authority’ as ‘rest[ing] on the assumption that knowl-
edge and expertise are unequally distributed, but that there is a common epistemological
framework that allows us to judge this inequality’, then it would appear that today it is
precisely this erstwhile taken-for-granted liberal universal framework which is being
taken apart from within.91
The argument presented in this article is generally in line with my earlier critique of
post-liberalism.92 Where this article goes further is in its explicit case in favour of founda-
tionalism, liberal or other. Analytical and normative foundations seem to be an essential
requirement of socially transformative policy efforts. While the critical ethos of post-liberal
argument is very welcome, it lacks a clear vision and understanding of agency to bring
about purposive social transformation. In contrast to my earlier article in Peacebuilding,
the argument here takes account of the fact that there is also an external dimension of
the liberal peace crisis, i.e. resistance by actors from the Global South. Liberal peace
efforts imposed from the top-down are necessarily fractured on the ground by local
84Max Weber, Wirtschaft Und Gesellschaft. Grundriss Der Verstehenden Soziologie (Tübingen: Mohr, 1995).
85Daase, ‘Was Ist Widerstand?’, 7–8, authors translation; see Daase and Deitelhoff, ‘Internationale Dissidenz. Ein For-
schungsprogramm’, 164–5.
86Daase and Deitelhoff, ‘Internationale Dissidenz. Ein Forschungsprogramm’, 163, author’s translation.
87Daase and Deitelhoff, Zur Rekonstruktion Globaler Herrschaft Aus Dem Widerstand, 3, original emphasis, author’s
translation.
88Furedi, Authority. A Sociological History, 383.
89Daase and Deitelhoff, ‘Internationale Dissidenz. Ein Forschungsprogramm’, 164, author’s translation.
90Michael Zürn, Martin Binder, and Matthias Ecker-Ehrhardt, ‘International Authority and Its Politicization’, International
Theory 4, no. 1 (2012): 86.
91Zürn, Binder, and Ecker-Ehrhardt, 86, emphasis added.
92Peter Finkenbusch, ‘“Post-Liberal” Peacebuilding and the Crisis of International Authority’, Peacebuilding 4, no. 3 (2016):
247–61.
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actors, practice and discourses.93 This article also brings in new empirical material, includ-
ing from the OECD, which is now emphasising the endogenous character of statebuilding
and the importance of local context.94
While the end of the Cold War ushered in a new era of external intervention by leading
Western states and the international organisations they had come to dominate, it also
‘brought to the fore problems of legitimacy that were obscured by the intensity of a
highly ideological superpower conflict’.95 In his much-discussed ‘Age of Extremes’, Eric
Hobsbawn came to a similar conclusion arguing that there exists ‘a crisis of the beliefs
and assumptions on which modern society had been founded since the Moderns won
their famous battles against the Ancients in the early eighteenth century – of the rational
and humanist assumptions, shared by liberal capitalism and communism […]’.96 Impor-
tantly, this crisis in liberal modernity has not been followed by ‘the constitution of a
[…] novel version of foundational norms for validating authority’.97 Thus, the crisis of
international authority, as reflected in the growing inability of Western interveners to pur-
posefully engage in a project of social transformation in the global periphery, is a
‘problem of foundational norms’ on the part of Western policy elites.98 If there is,
indeed, a crisis of auctoritas as the ‘capacity to initiate’,99 it is a dynamic of distancing
oneself from the ‘ideal of a foundational authority which someone develops (augments)
and takes forward into the present’.100 As Hannah Arendt pointed out in her discussion of
the word auctoritas and its root in the verb augere (augment), ‘what authority or those in
authority constantly augment is the foundation’.101 Against this background, it appears as
if contemporary practices of critique – such as post-liberalism – go in the opposite direc-
tion. They seem to be geared towards diminution. They vie to disassemble the existing
foundations, rather than to augment them – or, alternatively, to replace them with a
fresh set of new foundational norms. They are about ‘enabling people to destabilize
even deeply institutionalized meanings’.102 It would seem as if contemporary critiques
of the liberal peace ‘have opted for the strategy of evading the question [of “foundational
support”] altogether’.103 The post-liberal ‘sensitivity’104 seems to be ‘profoundly suspi-
cious of the exercise of authority’.105 As Roger Mac Ginty and Oliver Richmond make
clear themselves, there has been a ‘loss of confidence’ by the actors driving international
intervention.106 Importantly, they go on to argue that ‘this crisis at the international level
93Joakim Ojendala and Sivhuoch Ou, ‘From Friction to Hybridity in Cambodia: 20 Years of Unfinished Peacebuilding’,
Peacebuilding 1, no. 3 (2013): 365–80; Volker Boege et al., ‘Building Peace and Political Community in Hybrid Political
Orders’, International Peacekeeping 16, no. 5 (2009): 599–615.
94Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, International Support to Post-Conflict Transition. Rethinking
Policy, Changing Practice; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Do No Harm. International Support
for Statebuilding.
95Furedi, Authority. A Sociological History, 385.
96The Age of Extremes. The Short Twentieth Century, 1914–1991 (London: Abacus Books, 2004), 11.
97Furedi, Authority. A Sociological History, 386.
98Furedi, 6.
99Harro Hopfl, ‘Power, Authority and Legitimacy’, Human Resource Development International 2, no. 3 (1999): 232.
100Furedi, Authority. A Sociological History, 10.
101Hannah Arendt, ‘What Is Authority?’, in Between Past and Present (New York: Penguin, 2006), 91–141.
102Autesserre, Peaceland. Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention, 42.
103Furedi, Authority. A Sociological History, 205.
104Richmond, ‘Resistance and the Post-Liberal Peace’, 682.
105Furedi, Authority. A Sociological History, 2.
106‘The Local Turn in Peace Building: A Critical Agenda for Peace’, 763; see Neil Cooper, ‘Review Article: On the Crisis of the
Liberal Peace’, Conflict, Security and Development 7, no. 4 (2007): 605.
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is also partly internal’.107 What they fail to fully appreciate is how their own post-liberal
critique has been reflecting the erosion of liberal universal foundations.
Notably, the idea of an internal crisis of liberal foundations proposed in this article does
not necessarily contradict the critical insights provided by friction108 and hybridity109
arguments. Plans are unavoidably refractured by local discourses, actors and practices.
There is a friction between plan and reality.110 Building on a detailed case study of the
UN peace mission in Cambodia, Ojendala and Ou have demonstrated how ‘national
elites have become increasingly capable of renegotiating, resisting, or disregarding the
inserted order, or parts thereof, and increasingly powerful in creating a different
version of peace’.111 Foundationalism – for example the classic-liberal notion that all indi-
viduals everywhere, anytime are the bearers of inalienable rights and positive human fac-
ulties – does not contradict the empirical finding of a ‘vast gap between the externally
installed political system and the readiness of national actors to work with the
system’.112 We might ‘fundamentally question[…] the viability of liberal peace as a back-
bone for conflict resolution interventions’, but this, I argue, would need to be followed-up
with an alternative set of assumptions and concepts able to guide purposive social trans-
formation and human emancipation.113
The way forward
As the previous section has drawn out, the current crisis of the liberal peace is to some
extent internal to Western policy discourse. In addition to reflecting a political challenge
by the targets of international intervention in the Global South, post-liberal approaches to
peacebuilding point to a crisis of confidence among leading Western governments and
the international organisations they dominate. Paradoxically, international policy elites
today engage in comprehensive statebuilding projects around the world, involving the
reform of civil society, markets and public institutions, while their engagement with
the world increasingly lacks necessity and conviction. The policy remit of post-Cold War
international interventions has grown considerably, while the liberal universal drive of
these missions is increasingly hollowed out.
Post-liberal approaches to peacebuilding reflect a deeper unease with liberal universal
foundations. Taking the post-liberal argument as a paradigmatic reflection of contempor-
ary policy thinking, it becomes clear that the current crisis of the liberal peace is to some
107Mac Ginty and Richmond, ‘The Local Turn in Peace Building: A Critical Agenda for Peace’, 766.
108Ojendala and Ou, ‘From Friction to Hybridity in Cambodia: 20 Years of Unfinished Peacebuilding’; Annika Björkdahl and
Kristine Höglund, ‘Precarious Peacebuilding: Friction in Global–Local Encounters’, Peacebuilding 1, no. 3 (2013): 289–99.
109Boege et al., ‘Building Peace and Political Community in Hybrid Political Orders’; Volker Boege, Anne Brown, and Kevin
Clements, ‘Hybrid Political Orders, Not Fragile States’, Peace Review 21, no. 1 (2009): 13–21.
110James Scott, Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1998).
111Ojendala and Ou, ‘From Friction to Hybridity in Cambodia: 20 Years of Unfinished Peacebuilding’, 368.
112Ojendala and Ou, 373.
113For an argument in favour of the liberal peace even under conditions of hybridity, see Joanne Wallis (2018. ⍰Is There
Still a Place for Liberal Peacebuilding?‘, in Hybridity on the Ground in Peacebuilding and Development: Critical Conversa-
tions, Canberra: Australian National University Press, 83–98). Drawing on evidence from East Timor, she contends that
there is ‘evidence that many Timorese desire a role for modern liberal state institutions as a response to the inequality,
exclusions and injustices that can occur under local practices and institutions’ (95). She useful points out that at root
liberalism is about people being able to ‘consent to the manner in which their political unit is governed, including
deciding the extent to which it reflects liberal and local principles […], in the form of a “social contract”’ (97).
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extent a crisis of liberal universal foundations. At the heart of post-liberalism seems to be
an unwillingness to engage in analytical reductionism. While this new sensitivity has
helped to highlight the epistemic and normative binaries and exclusions of liberal uni-
versalism, it has proven unable to found a new basis for social transformation in inter-
national relations. It would appear that a socially transformative engagement with the
world calls for a set of normative and analytical foundations. Without a universalist
outlook the encounter with local context turns into an exercise in self-deconstruction,
as the work of Richmond and Mac Ginty demonstrates. Thus, what the critique presented
in this article calls for is a return to foundationalism – liberal or other. Foundations seem to
turn actors into agential selves in international politics.
Importantly, a return to liberal foundations would still be open to new and updated
knowledge. The notion of foundational support is entirely compatible with an idea of cri-
tique as furthering our understanding of the world. Georg Simmel, for example, described
nicely the way in which critique in a liberal-universal understanding of knowledge enables
scientific progress:
If we admit that our understanding may have somewhere an absolute norm, a supreme auth-
ority that is self-evident, but that its content remains in constant flux because knowledge pro-
gresses and every content suggests another which would be more profound and more
appropriate for the task, this is not scepticism; any more than it is scepticism when we
admit, as is generally done, that while natural phenomena are subject to universal laws,
these laws [i.e. their specific content] have to be corrected continually as our knowledge
increases […].114
According to Frank Furedi, this was an attempt to base authority on absolute norms
‘which are at the same time specific to the state of knowledge of the times. In this
way, the changing character of life could be captured through a form of authority that
could yield to new experience’.115 The central point here is that post-liberal critiques
do not aim to revise the historically specific ‘content’ of ‘absolute norms’ according to
the evolving state of scientific progress, but rather to do away with them completely.
Knowledge increases here involve a demolition of ‘absolute norms’. The foundational
norm which post-liberal critique is ultimately targeting seems to be the idea of the auton-
omous subject formulated at the beginning of political modernity in Hobbes’ Leviathan,
‘acknowledg[ing] the potential for human agency’.116 But while Hobbes, and liberal con-
tract theorists after him, formulated a new foundational norm (after the disintegration of
the old religious and tradition-based order) through the ‘initiating role of individual jud-
gement’ (seen as rational and self-interested), most contemporary critics ‘have opted for
the strategy of evading the question [of “foundational support”] altogether’.117
Conclusion
This article has engaged with the growing malaise of the liberal peace project. It has
argued that the current difficulties in the spread of liberal market democracy are an out-
growth of a larger crisis of liberal universal foundations in Western policy discourse. In
114The Philosophy of Money (London: Routledge, 1990), 104.




addition to reflecting a political challenge from the Global South,118 there seems to be a
dwindling belief in Western policy discourse in the ability of free markets and competitive
politics to remedy a wide range of political, social and economic problems. It is a crisis of
auctoritas as the ‘capacity to create and initiate’.119 The crisis of authority suggested in this
article dove-tails with the empirical finding that international interventions produce
hybrid political orders120 and are met by local, often hidden resistance.121 The internal
crisis of Western policy elites is, thus, accompanied by real-world obstacles on the
ground. Liberal retrenchment has been driven both by a crisis of confidence and pro-
blems of implementation in target societies themselves.
The article started with an outline of the interventionary zeal of the 2000s. As a para-
digmatic text, the analysis focused on Paris’ At War’s End and his call for a ‘new civilizing
mission’.122 As we saw in the first section, Paris was doubtful about the smooth, natural
transition to liberal market democracy in deeply divided post-conflict societies.
However, he continued to believe in the desirability of human rights, market economics
and secular politics. His ‘Institutionalization Before Liberalization’ approach emphasised
the (informal) institutional preconditions of liberal market democracy, but continued to
propagate the active spread of markets, elections and rights. In contrast, post-liberal
approaches advocate a departure from the ‘liberal peace paradigm itself’.123 Their
attempt to include the ‘unknowable’ local directly challenges the liberal order.124 Non-
Western episteme and practice are seen as antithetical to liberal universalism. Impor-
tantly, post-liberal approaches shy away from formulating a new set of epistemic foun-
dations. Richmond explicitly rejects proposing ‘a new meta-narrative of peace’.125 In
this way, post-liberalism expresses a larger uneasiness with totalising knowledge claims
in general. As Pol Bargués-Pedreny rightly points out, critical understandings of the
liberal peace today problematise the ‘totalities of existing discourses’.126 In this view,
the irreducible difference of local context ‘exceeds the possibility of governing from an
outside perspective’.127 Seen from this angle, the contemporary crisis of the liberal
peace articulates a crisis of foundations, rather than a legitimacy deficit between the
Global North and the Global South. It is a crisis of auctoritas, rather than a crisis of resist-
ance. Ultimately, what explains the transition from liberal to post-liberal frameworks
seems to be the fact that policymakers and critical academics react to policy failure by
questioning their own premises, rather than the world around them. They look for the
causes of policy failure within themselves, rather than turning to the outside world.
They critically interrogate their own knowledge claims, instead of looking at wider
118Daase, ‘Was Ist Widerstand?’; Daase and Deitelhoff, ‘Internationale Dissidenz. Ein Forschungsprogramm’.
119Furedi, Authority. A Sociological History, 62.
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Political Orders, Not Fragile States’.
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millan, 2011).
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123Richmond, ‘Beyond Liberal Peace? Responses to Backsliding’, 55; see Richmond, ‘Resistance and the Post-Liberal
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124Richmond, ‘A Post-Liberal Peace: Eirenism and the Everyday’, 566; see Mac Ginty and Richmond, ‘The Local Turn in
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125‘A Post-Liberal Peace: Eirenism and the Everyday’, 570.
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socio-structural inequalities which might prevent liberal market democracy from produ-
cing its desired collective outcomes. Here, problems of underdevelopment, civil conflict
and political instability grow out of the liberal universal outlook of interveners, rather
than the socio-structural inequalities of the international system. Contemporary econ-
omic, political and social problems reappear as problems of deficient perspectives,
rather than residing in the world itself.
Liberal peace advocates have commonly reacted to the failure of intervention by
framing the intervened as inapt, as somehow not ready or inherently incompatible
with a universal outlook.128 Rather than questioning the ability of a capitalist market
economy to overcome socio-economic inequalities at the domestic and international
level, the dominant reaction has been to blame essentialised differences of race or
culture. What the liberal peace has been used for is to stabilise an unequal world
economy and Eurocentric international order.129 However, the problem is not that inter-
national actors have a reductionist epistemology, that they have analytical and normative
foundations. In contrast to the post-liberal critique, this article has argued that we might
need a fresh set of foundations to inform collective action. What these foundations might
look like should be open to negotiation and political struggle.
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